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COURT OF APPEALS, 1957 TERM
Insufficiency of Information Which Did Not State Sources and Grounds of
Belief
The Code of Criminal Procedure defines an information as an "allegation
made to a magistrate that a person has been guilty of some designated crime.", 5
Where a defendant is charged with a misdemeanor an information is required. 66
The information must be verified 67 and in writing.68 The Court of Appeals has
now held (4-3) that an information used solely as a pleading must be based on
competent legal evidence, supported by depositions, or, at least, state the sources
of the information and grounds of the belief on which it is based.
In People v. James,69 the defendant, after submitting to an illegal arrest,
pleaded guilty to the unlicensed sale of alcoholic beverages. 70 The County Court
reversed the conviction, 7 1 and at the trial the defendant reasonably moved for
dismissal of the information on the ground that it was based on information and
belief but did not state the sources and grounds of the belief and thus was legally
insufficient even though used solely as a pleading and not as a basis for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. After denial of the motion, the District Attorney
submitted to the court two written statements signed by his informants said to be
the basis of the oral statements referred to in the information.
The Court held that the information was inadequate and that the defendant's
motion should have been granted. In order to protect the defendant from baseless
prosecutions which might involve his detention, the majority felt that an information even though used solely as a pleading should be required at least to indicate
the grounds of the informant's belief. The majority further reasoned that since
the depositions of the informants upon which the information was based were
submitted after the defendant had taken exception to the denial of his motion, and
without a motion to amend the pleading, the defect in the information was not
cured.
The dissent maintained that since the information, in the instant case, served
the function solely of a pleading it was sufficient if it informed the defendant of
the nature of the crime she was charged with and prevented her from being placed
65.

N. Y. CODE CRaM. PROC. §145.

66. See People v. James, 11 App.Div. 609, 43 N.Y.Supp. 315 (1896); People
v. Grogan 260 N.Y. 138, 183 N.E. 273 (1932).
67. People v. Scott, 3 N.Y.2d 148, 164 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1957).
68. People v. Jacoby, 304 N.Y. 33, 105 N.E.2d 613 (1952).
69. 4 N.Y.2d 482, 176 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1958).
70. N. Y. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL LAV §100(1).
71. The court reversed the conviction based on defendant's plea of guilty
because in its opinion, the conditions under which the plea was made did not
indicate that the defendant "acted freely, understandingly, competently and
intelligently." It appears that the plea was made by the defendant without
benefit of counsel.
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twice in jeopardy for the same offense, particularly since the sources of the
information were subsequently produced in court. The minority felt that the
majority decision was unduly restrictive, in that it added new and unnecessary
requir-,rments for a pleading-type information, and that any restriction should come
from the legislature.
The majority decision indicates a trend of the Court over the past few years
to extend more protection to an accusea against groundless prosecutions.72 In the
instant case, the majority recognized that to allow an information, imufficient to
support a warrant of arrest, to confer jurisdiction on a magistrate to try the
defendant would be to reward the prosecution for an illegal arrest. Little objection
can be found to the majority's position that no defendant should be required to
defend against criminal charges based solely on unidentifiable hearsay.
Sufficiency of Indictment
Section 1864 of the Penal Law provides that a public officer who wrongfully
obtains or converts property held, owned, Dr in the possession of any county is
guilty of a felony. In a plan to get drugs for a retail store at institutional rates
the defendant, a county health officer, purchased goods through a county home.
When the drugs were delivered to the home, the defendant took possession of the
drugs and transported them to a retail druggist who then paid the drug manufacturer by cashier's check. The defendant was indicted for a felony under section
1864. Upon appeal from denial of a motion to dismiss tle indictment the defendant contended that he could not be guilty of violation of section 1864 because the
county did not have an ownership interest in the property taken by the defendant.
Until the present case there had been no judicial interpretation of the word
"possession" in the section. The Court held that the county need not have an
ownership interest in the property but only a right to possession in order that a
public official be held liable under section 18 64 .73 The county became a gratuitous
bailee with a right and duty to retain possession for the manufacturer until he
could determine the rightful owner. Thus the statute makes a public official
criminally liable for purchasing goods for fiimself under the county or other
office's name and with his own funds. The Court indicated that this reasoning
would not apply where the seller knows that the goods were for other then
official use.
The Court also refused to dismiss an indictment charging defendant with
larceny, holding that a person who with criminal intent and false representation
of fact relied on by the seller, obtains more than that to which be knows he would
72. See People v. Scott, supra note 67; People v. Jacoby, supra note 68.
73. People v. Kirkup, 4 N.Y.2d 209, 173 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1958).

